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THE WARFARE-WELFARE TRADEOFF: HEALTH, PUBLIC AID AND HOUSING*
by Kathleen Peroff
University of Maryland
It is a truism that resources devoted to defense are unavailable for non-
defense purposes. Investment in defense takes place partly by reducing civilian
spending on consumer and capital goods through tax rates that are higher than they
would otherwise be and partly by reducing government spending on non-defense
programs. The purpose of this paper is to test for the existence and magnitude of
the latter tradeoff over the years 1929-1971 in the United States. In particular,
the analysis concerns the tradeoff between defense and three social welfare
policies: health, public aid and housing. In addition, the analysis examines
whether these tradeoffs differ during periods of war and peace.
Theoretical Arguments
One prevailing theory is that no tradeoff occurs between military and welfare
expenditures. Proponents of this theory argue that modern society moves toward a
warfare-welfare state in which political elites must buy off the populace with
welfare goods. One reason is that welfare policy promotes the growth of GNP by
contributing to better physical and psychological health for the workers which in
turn promotes efficiency and production. (Baran and Sweezy, 1966; Rimlinger, 1971,
59-60; Helo, 1974, 89-90). Another argument in favor of this theory is that wel-
fare spending contributes to political order by co-opting the masses and rewards
them for fighting wars. (Gouldner, 1970).
In a more pragmatic vein, Eckstein concludes:
I think that historical experience has been that governments are
either stingy or they're spenders, and if they're stingy about
defense, they're stingy about everything. I would say that the
historical record suggests that the association between civilian spend-
ing and military spending is positive, not negative. (1963: 1012)
A related argument suggests that defense spending, even if greater than neces-
sary for national security, is not necessarily a waste, since alternative uses of
economic resources would be equally "frivolous." For instance, the money might be
*The author wishes to thank Gillian Dean and Margaret Podolak-Warren for help-
ful comments. This research was done with the financial help of the General
Research Board, University of Maryland.
turned back to the taxpayers for personal consumption and not put into other policy
areas. If this is the case, the real price of defense is merely the loss of
luxuries for middle and upper classes.1 However, this argument holds only if the
income tax is truly progressive. Pechman's (1971) research indicates that effective
tax rates are mildly progressive over most of the range of incomes but exhibit re-
gressivity at high levels of income. Thus, the burden of defense is carried to a
greater extent by lower income groups. The argument that defense merely displaces
frivolous consumption has yet to be empirically supported.
The previous lines of theorizing hold that there is certainly no negative
relationship between defense and other policy sectors and that there may be a
positive relationship. Other theorists, however, take a contrary position and view
defense and welfare policy goals as mutually exclusive. They argue that military
burdens drain political, technical and economic resources from domestic programs.
Wilensky contends that a foreign policy accenting military action without total and
sustained mobilization is inflationary enough to enhance the policy appeal of the
position "cut the domestic frills, balance the budget." (Wilensky, 1975, 79-80)
Similarly, Russett contests the position that military spending is necessary to
maintain overall demand in the modern economy and argues that defense expenditures
are now more likely to force tradeoffs than they were thirty years ago. (1970, 133)
A related argument is that heavy defense investment retards the establishment
of new welfare or health programs. If a country supports a burdensome defense,
other domestic policies or programs may not be introduced or established because
policymakers perceive the cost as insupportable given present and anticipated de-
fense sector outlays. This possibility is legitimately a substitution effect al-
though it cannot be empirically supported by examining current expenditure data.
In another vein, government funded research and development is primarily concen-
trated in the defense and space industries while non-defense agencies do not have
research and development programs that relate broadly to their entire mission. This
continued imbalance in government research efforts also retards innovations in wel-
fare, housing, and health care programs.
Existing Empirical Research
Empirical findings to date are mixed. The number of studies which indicate
the existence of a tradeoff relationship approximates the number which show that
none exists. A review of this research discussion will center on conceptual and
methodological problems in these studies which account for some of the confusion.
Pryor is the only researcher to apply both cross-sectional and time-series
data analyses to this question. His cross-sectional study of seven "capitalist"
and seven "socialist" countries reveals no evidence of a substitution effect
between non-military (all non-military expenditures are lumped together) and
military expenditures for two different years: 1956 and 1962. (1968, 121) How-
ever, his time-series analysis for the period 1950-1962 uncovers a more varied
pattern. In those countries where defense expenditures are a relatively small
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proportion of the GNP, there exists no statistically significant inverse relation-
ship between defense and current public expenditures. When defense expenditures
are a relatively more important part of the governmental budget, a significant
but small substitution relationship is evident, but only when transfer payments
are excluded. When transfer payments are added to current expenditures, there is
no substitution effect. (1968, 298) Similarly, in another time-series analysis
over the period 1950-1970 for Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United
States, Caputo finds that defense does not undercut welfare expenditures. (1975,
445-446)
Recent research on Latin American countries also indicates no tradeoff between
these two expenditures. In an analysis of the relationship between defense and
education expenditures, Ames and Goff obtain positive and significant correlations
between changes in defense and education outlays and conclude that these two
policies are not mutually exclusive. (1975, 181) Examining Brazilian budgetary
outlays, Hayes also finds that when correlating levels of defense expenditures
with what she terms "social development" expenditures, the correlation is positive.
The rapid expansion of both the whole economy and the federal sector in Brazil over
the period of her analysis is used to explain these results. Correlating spending
ratios (category of expenditures/total federal expenditures), she obtains a nega-
tive but insignificant correlation. In sum, her analysis indicates that military
spending does not have serious negative consequences for economic and social in-
vestment in Brazil. (1975, 33)
Lastly, similar results are found with cross-sectional data on approximately
120 nations reported in the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.
Defense and health expenditures, each as a proportion of GNP are not inversely
correlated. (Hudson and Taylor, 1972, 34)
While the results of these studies do not strongly support theoretical argu-
ments which suggest a positive relation between defense and social welfare
spending, neither do they support the substitution hypothesis of an inverse
relationship. They do suggest that major decisions about the magnitudes of various
public consumption expenditures are made in relative isolation from each other.
Other empirical analyses, however, do find an inverse relationship between these
expenditures.
In an analysis of defense spending in the United States between 1938 and 1969,
Russett concludes that military spending undercut welfare first, then education
and then health. (1970, 151) Looking at the post-World War II experience of
Great Britain, France and Canada, he again gives a qualified "yes" to the question
of substitution effects. (1970, 171-174) Wilensky's findings tend to corroborate
those of Russett. Although his cross-sectional analysis indicates that military
spending is irrelevant to welfare outlays, his "time-series analysis" shows that
in nations with very large military budgets, war and welfare are mutually exclusive
goals. He emphasizes the impact of the Cold War period as having the most obvious
depressing effect on the growth of social welfare expenditures. In a sample of
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sixteen countries, "great increases in military spending in 1950-1952 (military
spending/GNP 1952 minus military spending/GNP 1950) are associated with small
increases in social security spending for the whole period 1950-1966 (r=-.4 3)."
(1975, 77-79)
In sum, empirical findings are not very consistent. Those research designs
employing cross-sectional data show little or no support for a tradeoff or sub-
stitution effect while time-series studies have revealed more complex patterns.
In the following section, discussion focuses on certain conceptual and methodolog-
ical problems which characterize these studies and which cause their different
results.
Concerptual and Methodological Issues
One source of variation in findings is whether the analysis is based on cross-
sectional or time-series data. The argument here is that cross-sectional analysis
is simply an inadequate aprroach to this question. Cross-sectional analysis
reveals whether different countries exhibit budgetary tradeoffs at a single point
in time. This information is simjly not sufficient for rejection or acceptance
of the substitution hypothesis which is better tested by examination of budgetary
patterns of behavior over time. Results based on cross-sectional data may and
have been shown to vary for different but close years for the same group of
countries, causing problems in reaching any definite conclusion. (See Pryor, 1968,
231)
A second problem is that of those studies using time-series data, most have
relied on relatively small time periods for their analysis. Usually this constraint
is due to problems of data availability. However, analysis of very short time-
series prevents strong generalizations and precludes empirical tests of oscillations
in relationships during significant sub-periods.
Third, in research based on time-series analysis, either no or inadequate
attention has been given to certain statistical problems. Especially noteworthy
is the problem of serial correlation in regression and correlation analysis. If
not eliminated, serial correlation leads to inaccurate tests of significance which
are biased towards rejection of the null hypothesis. Thus, there is a high prob-
ability of accepting as true relationships which in fact are spurious. (Hibbs,
1974) In this case, researchers may erroneously infer the existence of a tradeoff
when none actually exists.
Fourth, many existing studies have not been especially cautious when defining
and operationalizing the expenditure terms. Specifically, the results of empirical
analysis for tradeoffs or substitution effects are clearly influenced by the as-
sumptions made about the nature of the allocation game. For instance, no sub-
stitutive effects may exist between absolute levels (or percapita amounts) of
defense spending and absolute levels (or percapita amounts) of other governmental
spending if the allocation process is an expanding-sum game represented by a
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growing public sector. Negative shifts in the percentage allocation figures do not
necessarily entail negative shifts in the absolute or percapita levels. The ex-
ample given by Hayes underlines a simple but worthwhile pcint:
Assume, for example, a government with $100 to spend in year 1,
and $200 in year 2. If 15% of the budget is allocated to both
military and welfare in year 1, each sector gets $15. In year
2, a one-to-one percentage tradeoff occurs and military gets
20% of the total while welfare gets only 10%. Military receives
$40, a substantial increase, but welfare gets $20, still an
increase over the previous year. (1975, 28)
Thus, welfare appears to be cut only in percentage terms since the absolute levels
for both defense and welfare are increasing. However, a substitution effect is
in fact occurring; the increase in the level amount for welfare is not as large
as it would be if the defense increment was smaller. Simple correlation analysis
of the level amounts does not reveal this and may lead the researcher to infer
that a substitution effect does not occur. Thus, in the examination of tradeoff
relationships, it is important to examine the ratios rather than the level or
percapita amounts.
A fifth problem in this kind of research is suggested by a study which shows
that tradeoff relations vary over different time periods. (Hollenhorst and Ault,
1971, 760-763) Estimation of a single tradeoff parameter for a long period of
time may hide oscillation in the tradeoff relationship during sub-periods and hence
bias results. In this case, the significant sub-periods are periods of war during
which defense expenditures become more dominant and, as a result, lead to larger
substitutions or tradeoffs than during periods of peace.
In sum, these pitfalls suggest the need for new analysis which is based on
time-series data over a longer time period in which potential serial correlation
is examined, the expenditures are measured as ratios and last, tests are done for
changes in the tradeoff relationship in war and non-war years.
ANALYSIS
The following analysis tests the tradeoff hypothesis over the years 1929
through 1971 for the United States. Additionally, the analysis tests the possibil-
ity of changes in these tradeoff relationships during 1) World War II (194l-1945),
2) the Korean War (1950-1953) and 3) the Vietnam War (1965-1971) versus non-hot-
war periods. The large number of years in the sample allows for a good test of
variations in tradeoffs during three different types of war as well as a good
number of non-war years.
Annual time-series expenditure data at the federal and total (federal, state
and local) levels have been collected for the three policy areas: health, public
aid and housing.2 The purpose of this study is to analyze tradeoffs between
-370-
defense and domestic policies which are primarily distributive or re-distributive
in nature, so education is not included. Also excluded are social security and
veterans expenditures; in both cases, beneficiaries have "contributed" either
through payroll taxes or military activity. In addition, social security expen-
ditures come from a special fund separate from the normal budget so that the
tradeoff notion is not very meaningful.
Description of the expenditure data
Health: Public health expenditures cover the following general categories:
hospital and medical care, medical research, maternal and child health programs,
school health, other public health activities and medical facilities construction.
With the exception of school health and state and locally owned hospitals,
federal health spending is funneled into all of the above program areas. While
there is no national health insurance covering the entire population, the federal
government does provide hospital and medical care for specified groups of bene-
ficiaries: Indians, Alaskan natives, lepers, narcotic addicts, federal prison
inmates and smaller miscellaneous groups. The federal government also provides
hospital and medical care for military personnel and their dependents and veterans.
However, these defense-related expenditures have been excluded from the health
figure, since they are more properly regarded as defense related expenditures
necessitated by previous wars and maintenance of a peacetime army. Therefore,
all defense related health expenditures are included under defense.
Federal, state and local financing covers medical research, medical facilities
construction, programs for maternal and child health care and other public health
activities. The federal contribution is usually larger in all of these program
areas. This is especially the case with respect to hospital construction and
medical research. Only county/state owned psychiatric, general or tuberculosis
hospitals are completely financed by these levels of government.
Public Aid: Public aid expenditures refer to those programs that provide
payments in cash or services to individuals and families. Unlike social insurance
programs which pay benefits as an earned right, public aid programs rely on a
means or income test to determine eligibility. The following programs are in-
cluded under this expenditure category: Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(ADC, AFDC); Old Age Assistance (OAA); Medical Assistance for the Aged (MAA); Aid
to the Blind (AB); Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD); Medical
Assistance (MA); state and locally financed General Assistance Programs (GA).
3
Housing: Housing expenditures refer to government sponsored and/or supported
programs that specifically aim to assist families in meeting their housing needs.
These expenditures cover two broad categories of programs: 1) public housing owned
and/or operated by a public body and 2) other housing programs which relate pri-
marily to government programs designed to assist private industry in financing
subsidized housing for low-income and moderate-income families. (Department of
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Health, Education, and Welfare, 1968, 163)
Government loans for low-rent public housing or for college housing ..e not
included on the grounds that they will be repaid or privately refinanced.4 Pro-
grams providing credit facilities for home-financing institutions and mortgage and
loan insurance programs are also excluded. For the most part, they have resulted
in no net cost to the government since income from these programs exceeds ex-
penditures. Finally, certain war emergency housing program outlays, primarily
intended for the use of defense and wartime workers, have been subtracted from the
expenditure series.
Estimation Technique
Since the regression equations in this study are estimated from time-series
data, there is a potential problem of serial correlation. One of the assumptions
of the classical normal linear regression model is non-autoregression in the re-
siduals which implies that the disturbance occurring at one point of observation
is not correlated with any other disturbance. This assumption is often violated
in models of time-series data. When it is, the properties of the least squares
estimators are no longer those of the best linear unbiased estimators. While they
are unbiased and consistent, they are not asymptotically efficient (Kmenta, 1971,
278) Thus, conventional formulae for carrying out tests of significance or con-
structing confidence intervals for the regression coefficients may lead to in-
correct inferences.
To solve this potential problem of serial correlation, a variant of Generalized
Least Squares estimation is used. The Cochrane-Orcutt Method is employed to esti-
mate the p or autocorrelation coefficient. See Cochrane and Orcutt, 1949, 32-61;
Johnston, 1972, 262). This p is then used to transform the original data in the
following manner and the equation is estimated via Ordinary Least Squares. Given
the following equation,
Y = B0 + BIX + u
the transformed variables are:
Y* = Yt - Pyt-i
X* = xt - Y-t- i
BE = B U( -p
0 0
u*= ut - Put-,
This method of estimation will be used only when serial correlation remains
after OLS estimation. If the Durbin-Watson test indicates no significant first-
order serial correlation after OLS estimation, then GLS is not used and OLS
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estimates are presented. In the more likely case of serial correlation, GLS helps
to remove autocorrelation in the residuals and thus allow "safer" conditions for
hypothesis testing.
Two equations are estimated for each of the three categories of expenditures:
l) Y1 = B0 
+ BIX + B2D1 
+ B3Z1 
+ BZ 2 
+ B5Z3 + u
and 2) Y2 = B0 + BIX + B2 D2 + B3 Z4 + BhZ5 + B5Z6 + u
where Y1 = federal health or public aid or housing expenditure/total federal
expenditures
Y2 = total health or public aid or housing expenditures/total expenditures
of all levels of government
X = real GNP percapita (1958 dollars)
D1 = defense expenditures/total federal expenditures
D2 = defense expenditures/total expenditures of all levels of government
Z1 = D in World War II years only,
0 for all other years
Z2 = Dl in Korean War years only,
0 for all other years
Z3 = Dl in Vietnam War years only,
0 for all other years
Z4 = D2 in World War II years only,
0 for all other years
Z5 = D2 in Korean War years only,
0 for all other years
Z6 = D2 in Vietnam War years only,
0 for all other years
B is the estimate of the peacetime relationship between the proportion spent
on defense and the proportion spent on the other expenditure categories. It should
be negative and significant if the prediction of the tradeoff hypothesis is correct.
The sum of the coefficients B2 and B3 estimates the relationship during the World
War II years. The relationships for the Korean and Vietnam wars are the sums
(B2 + B) and (B2 + B5) respectively. The estimate B1 acts as a control for the
relationship between GNP/population and the growth of the three expenditures and
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should be positive.
In cases where the t value(s) for the interaction coefficients (B3 through
B5 ) is/are insignificant
5 (i.e., the tradeoff does not appear to change during
war years), it is possible that multicollinearity is causing depressed t values.
To check out this possibility, the hypothesis is tested that any two or three of
the war periods jointly have different tradeoff effects from peacetime years. For
example, to test for the joint impact of the World War II and Korean War experiences
on the relationship, the following test is constructed:
B3 + B4 = 0
- 23+ 2 + 2 Cov/ 3B 3 B4
a significant t allows one to infer that the joint change in the tradeoff relation-
ship during the years of World War II and the Korean War is significantly different
from the tradeoff relationship during peacetime years.
Results
Health: The estimates for both federal and total health expenditures are
given in Table 1. Since serial correlation remains after Ordinary Least Squares
estimation, Generalized Least Squares, as previously described, has been used to
estimate these equations. In both cases, the Durbin-Watson values for the GLS
Equations surpass the upper boundary value of 1.58 required to accept the hypothesis
of no serial correlation at the .01 significance level.
Overall, the model fares poorly. Although the R2 is biased due to the use of
GIB (Generalized Least Squares), its low value of .11 and the insignificance of all
of the estimates (including GNP) suggest the model is inadequately specified for
federal health outlays. The evidence points to no defense-federal health tradeoff
during either peacetime or periods of war. Nor is there evidence of a joint
tradeoff effect during the combined war years.
A significant tradeoff does take place, however, for total health expenditures.
With each percentage increase in the defense ratio during years of peace, the health
share of total expenditures declines by about .03%. The results indicate no sig-
nificantly different (larger or smaller) tradeoff during the Vietnam War. However
the tradeoff is greater by .003 during World War II and smaller by .005 during the
Korean War years. While these changes in the tradeoff are almost significant at
the .05 level, they do not represent strong oscillations.
Public Aid: GLS estimates are given for the same equations in Table 2 for
federal and total public aid expenditures. Again, the new Durbin-Watson values
are large enough to reject the presence of first-order serial correlation. A
substantial tradeoff or substitution occurs between public aid and defense for both
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expenditure measures. Each percentage increase in the federal defense ratio takes
.25% from the public aid share; each percentage increase in the total defense ratio
is obtained by taking .15% from the public aid share of total expenditures. This
tradeoff does not change in either direction during any of the wars, nor is there
any evidence to suggest a joint wartime change in the tradeoff. Lastly, the
economic term is not significant, underscoring the lack of a relationship between
the success of welfare in the budget and the state of the economy.
In conclusion, while the model does not explain a large proportion of the
variance in either expenditure share, the significance and size of the defense
term underlines the importance of the tradeoff notion in predicting public aid
outlays in the United States.
Housing: Table 3 presents the results for housing policy. The analysis does
not favor the tradeoff hypothesis either in years of peace or war for the federal
housing ratio. Nor is there any evidence of a combined war tradeoff during World
War II and the Korean War. During the Vietnam War years, the relationship is
actually positive, contrary to the predictions of the tradeoff hypothesis.
Results from analysis of total housing expenditures are less definitive.
While no tradeoff takes place between the total defense and total housing ratios
in peacetime, the t values for the interaction terms for World War II and the
Korean war years are negative and quite large though not conventionally significant.
A test for their joint significance was computed and the new t is -l.47, significant
at the .10 level. If significance requirements are relaxed, the analysis suggests
that public housing programs were hurt more during World War II and the Korean War
than during non-war years when they were not hurt at all. Last, while GNP has no
effect on federal public housing policy, it is important to the total housing ex-
penditure share.
Conclusion
The substitution or tradeoff hypothesis is supported to different degrees for
each of the three policy areas considered. Public aid programs are most undermined
by defense. Since these expenditures constitute over time a much larger proportion
of both the federal and total U.S. budgets than either health or housing combined,
it is not surprising they are more sensitive to defense. In addition, these ex-
penditures are the most explicitly redistributive in nature, and therefore, the
most politically sensitive, so they are more likely to suffer when defense spending
is rising.
A health-defense tradeoff also occurs in the case of health expenditures by
all levels of government. The tradeoff is smaller than that between public aid
and defense but nevertheless significant. However, while the substitution effect
between actual levels of expenditures on health and defense is smaller than for
public aid, the fact that no national health insurance has been enacted may be in
part due to the defense burden on the budget. As noted earlier, this is a potential
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substitution effect which analysis of actual expenditure data cannot reveal.
Given the high level of the existing budget, of which defense is a major con-
tributor, and given the costs of establishing some form of national health in-
surance, one could argue that enactment of the latter has been delayed (although
there are obviously other factors, as well, which have prevented the establishment
of national health insurance).
Housing is least affected by defense spending. For most of the time period,
no substantial tradeoff has transpired, although tentative evidence suggests that
World War II and the Korean War did have limited adverse impacts on public housing
programs. To some extent, the lack of a substantial tradeoff here may be due to
the minimal share of federal or total expenditures devoted to housing needs. The
lower political sensitivity of housing and its small share of the budget may dispose
policy-makers to choose other domestic areas to cut for defense purposes. As sug-
gested earlier, only when a policy sector constitutes a "significant" share of the
budget, does it appear that its allotment is adversely affected by military needs.
Tests for changes in the tradeoff during periods of military mobilization re-
veal no substantial differences for the most part. During World War II, the
health-defense tradeoff grows by .3% while it declines by .5% during the Korean
War. One explanation for this switch is that World War II was more expensive
and hence a little more costly in terms of health than was the Korean War. Unmet
health needs after World War II stimulated greater health expenditures in the
early 1950's inspite of the Korean War. For instance, expenditures under the 1946
Hill-Burton program which initiated federal grants to assist states in hospital
construction, increased significantly during years of the Korean War. In the
case of total housing expenditures, a very small housing-defense tradeoff takes
place during World War II and the Korean War while none occurs during any of the
other years. Generally, the lack of substantial oscillations in these tradeoffs
is that defense spending did not decline after World War II and Korea due to the
beginning of the Cold War. Prevailing heavy defense investment in non-war years
during the 1950's and early 1960's contributed to tradeoffs equivalent to those
in war years. This suggests that "war" is not a very relevant concept per se in
explaining tradeoffs if defense outlays remain almost as high during years of peace
as they are in periods of war. Another argument for the lack of substantial trade-
off changes is that tax increases during war periods expand the budgetary pie which
allows higher defense outlays without hurting domestic programs more than they are
hurt in non-war years.
In conclusion, this analysis has focused on tradeoffs between three domestic
public policies and defense programs. Future research is needed on the impact of
defense on other public programs. In addition, since the private sector also
provides welfare, housing and health services, it is important to know the impact
of a heavy defense burden on the private sector levels of these services. For
instance, does a heavy defense burden cause a decline in private health consumption
of medical care because of higher tax rates (due in part to defense spending) which
cause lower personal income? Does defense spending lead to lower levels of private
-379-
hospital or housing construction because the government employs deficit financing
to support its defense burden and thus competes for loanable funds with private
bidders? Answers to these questions would add further information to the extent
of the warfare-welfare tradeoff.
Endnotes
iWhile this is not Russett's argument, he discusses it in What Price Vigilance,
1970, p. 139.
2Data sources are: i) U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Historical Summary of Government Finances in the
United States, 1902-1957 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Printing Office, 1959).
2) U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Social Security Administration, Office of Research
and Statistics, Social Welfare Expenditures Under
Public Programs in the United States, 1929-1966,
Report No. 25 compiled by Ida C. Merriam and Alfred
M. Skolnik (Washington, D.C., 1972).
3) U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Social Security Administration, Office of Research
and Statistics, Social Welfare Expenditures, 1970-71;
1971-72 compiled by Alfred Skolnik and Sophie R. Dales
(Washington, D.C., 1971 and 1972).
3Expenditures on the Food Stamp and Commodity Surplus Programs are not in-
cluded in this series.
4
However, since these loans are made at below-market interest rates, they
could be included in the expenditure series to the extent that a subsidy is being
provided the borrower.
5Significance is understood to mean the .05 level in this analysis.
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